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Abstract: The Bush administration established the Terrorist Surveillance Program
to conduct electronic surveillance on communications between suspected terrorists.
Many advocacy groups, scholars, and journalists declared that the Terrorist
Surveillance Program was unconstitutional and violated the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. For over a year, the Bush administration vehemently denied these
claims and defended the program as a constitutional exercise of the president's
power. After a federal district court ruled that the Terrorist Surveillance Program
was unconstitutional, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
vacated the lower court's opinion and remanded the case for dismissal on the
grounds of standing. Despite the Sixth Circuit's decision, the administration
terminated the program in January 2007 in response to public pressure.
* The author is a J.D./M.B.A. candidate at The Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law
and Fisher College of Business, Class of 2009. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in
Political Science from Baylor University in 2004.
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION: THE "TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM"
On December 16, 2005, The New York Times revealed that the
Bush administration authorized the National Security Agency ("NSA")
to conduct warrantless surveillance on Americans.I The
administration termed this practice-somewhat controversially-the
Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP").2 Although the program's
specifics remain a secret, reports indicate that the surveillance possibly
began as early as February 2001. 3 On January 17, 2007, Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales wrote a letter to the Senate Judiciary
Committee and reported that the administration would stop the
program.4 The administration had to abide by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA") after it abandoned the TSP.5 Under intense
pressure from the White House, Congress amended FISA in August
2007 to make it easier for the executive branch to obtain wiretaps. 6
The TSP targeted cross-border phone and e-mail communications
between persons or organizations in the United States and abroad.7
The operational details of the TSP are unknown, but it is understood
that the NSA had the authority to conduct wiretaps if it suspected an
overseas call or e-mail involved persons or organizations linked to al
1 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
2 John Diamond & David Jackson, Surveillance Program Protects Country, Bush Says, USA
TODAY, Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-23-bushx.htm.
3 Andrew Harris, Spy Agency Sought US. Call Records Before 9/11, Lawyers Say,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 30, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
ablV0cO64zJE&refer.
4 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen of the United States, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S.
Judiciary Comm., and Arlen Spector, Ranking Minority Member, S. Judiciary Comm. (Jan.
17, 2007), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf fiscletter.pdf [hereinafter AG Letter].
5 See Paula Wolfson, Bush Urges Action on Terrorist Surveillance Legislation, VOICE OF
AMERICA, Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.voanews.con/english/2007-08-01-voa58.cfin; see also
Chip Pitts, The End of Illegal Domestic Spying? Don't Count on It, WASH. SPEC., Mar. 15,
2007, http://www.washingtonspectator.com/articles/20070315surveillance_ l.cfm.
6 Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, House Approves Wiretap Measure, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
2007, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/04/AR2007080401744.html?hpid--topnews.
7 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1.
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Qaeda.8 Many scholars debated the program's legality in light of
FISA and constitutionality with regards to the First Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment, and the scope of the executive's Article II
powers. 9 Congress intended FISA to serve as the "exclusive means by
which electronic surveillance ... may be conducted." 10 Judge Taylor,
a federal district court judge, argued that the TSP circumvented the
procedures established in FISA; therefore, by acting outside of FISA,
the program was illegal.1 Although the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit eventually overturned Judge Taylor's
decision, her opinion provoked a maelstrom of responses. 2  This
outbreak of public response motivated members of Congress to
propose several pieces of legislation addressing the controversial
program.' 3  Ultimately, the Bush administration abandoned the TSP
8 id.
9 See, e.g., John Cary Sims, What NSA is Doing... and Why It's Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 105 (2006).
'0 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2000).
11 ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated 493 F.3d
644 (6th Cir. 2007) ("In this case, the President has acted, undisputedly, as FISA forbids.")
[hereinafter ACLU]].
12 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., Jan. 9, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former
Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department Letter
of Dec. 22, 2005, 81 IND. L.J. 1364 (2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-response.pdf; PETER SWIRE, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, LEGAL FAQs ON NSA WIRETAPS, (2006),
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/nsa wiretaps.pdf; but cf Letter from John Eastman, Dir.,
Claremont Institute's Ctr. for Constitutional Jurisprudence, to James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, H. Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 27, 2006), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/nsaeastmanltr.pdf; Testimony of Robert Turner, Assoc.
Dir. of the Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Law, University of Virginia, before the S. Judiciary Comm.
(Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfi?id=1841&witid=5217; David Yerushalmi, Politics or National Existence?
Choose or Perish., THE INST. FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC & POLITICAL STUDIES WEEKLY
ESSAYS, Dec. 28, 2005, http://www.iasps.org/opeds/show article.php?lang=
2&main=&type=4&articleid=503; Letter from Caroline Fredrickson, Dir., Washington
Legislative Office of the ACLU, to Members of the Senate (Mar. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/ 246231eg20060316.html; ACLU, Senate Judiciary
Committee to Blindly Consider NSA Legislation, Fails to Challenge White House Claims of
Unlimited Executive Power, June 8, 2006,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/25810prs20060608.html; Eric Lichtblau & David
Johnston, Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at
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while a Democrat-controlled Congress amended FISA to provide the
executive branch greater power to conduct surveillance. 
14
II. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
In 1978, Congress passed FISA to define the parameters of
permissible government surveillance of U.S. residents. 5 The TSP's
critics assert that the program "clearly" side-stepped the legall2
mandated procedures FISA established for government surveillance.m°
The Bush administration counters that Congress never intended FISA
to be a permanent check on the president's electronic surveillance
capabilities. Additionally, the administration posits that Congress
amended FISA through the Authorization for Use of Military Force
("AUMF"), which permitted the president to conduct warrantless
surveillance.17  Legal commentators have criticized these arguments
raised by the Bush administration. 18
13 See, e.g., Katherine Shrader, Senators Question Gonzales on NSA Wiretaps, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/02/06/
senators have-toughquestions forgonzales/; Letter from Dianne Feinstein, et al., U.S.
Senators, to Members of the Senate (Dec. 20, 2005), available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/05releases/r-i-spying.htm; Dianne Feinstein, Senate Judiciary
Committee Approves Feinstein-Specter Bill Reaffirming FISA as the Exclusive Means for
Domestic Electronic Surveillance, Sept. 13, 2006, http://feinstein.senate.gov/06releases/r-fisa-
commte.htm.
14 Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 6.
"5 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 15 (1978).
16 SwIRE, supra note 12, at 1. See Brian R. Decker, Comment, "The War of Information ": The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and the President's Warrantless-
Wiretapping Program, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 291, 315-20 (2006); see also Sims, supra note 9,
at 140.
17 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at
http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa1 1906wp.pdf [hereinafter
White Paper].
18 See, e.g., SWIRE, supra note 12, at 9; Sims, supra note 9, at 130-33; Decker, supra note 16,
at 321-33.
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A. HISTORY AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF FISA
The Nixon administration used warrantless wiretaps in 1968 to
gather information on members of the White Panther Party for its
alleged role in the bombing of Central Intelligence Agency offices in
Ann Arbor, Michigan. 19 The government's attempt to use warrantless
wiretaps in this domestic national security case was blocked by
District Judge Keith's United States v. Sinclair decision. 20  The
government challenged Judge Keith's judgment in United States v.
U.S. District Court (Keith).2T The government argued that in cases of
national security, warrantless wiretaps are permissible in light of the
president's constitutional obligation to ensure national security.22 The
Supreme Court rejected the government's argument,23 but explicitly
limited its holding to instances of domestic security.24 Thus, the Court
left the door open for a subsequent determination of the proper "scope
of the President's surveillance power with respect to activities of
foreign powers, within or without this country.,
25
In the wake of Keith, Congress enacted FISA "to provide the
secure framework by which the executive branch may conduct
legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
within the context of this nation's commitment to privacy and
individual rights." 26 The plan enacted in FISA was a direct reflection
of the Supreme Court's suggested remedy to the situation it
encountered in Keith.27 Consequently, while the statutory landscape
19 Turmoil on Taps, TIME, Mar. 6, 1972,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,910229-1,00.html; posting by Spencer
Overton to Blackprof.com, http://www.blackprof.com/archives/2005/12/
judgedamonj_keith no warrant.html (Dec. 18, 2005, 16:21 EST).
20 United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (holding that in
wholly domestic cases the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement cannot be circumvented
because of national security).
21 United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
22 1d. at 310-11.
23 Id. at 323-24.
24 Id. at 321-22.
25 Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
26 S. REP. No. 95-604.
27 Sims, supra note 9, at 109.
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governing electronic surveillance has evolved since the Supreme
Court's opinion in Keith, the Court's holding remains good law.
Although Congress enacted FISA to contain the executive branch's
use of electronic surveillance within constitutional boundaries,
initially, some civil liberties activists proclaimed that the Act went too
far.29  Courts, however, consistently have found FISA constitutional
because of the statute's requirement of judicial oversight of
surveillance.3 °
FISA provides two exceptions that permit warrantless surveillance,
neither of which would apply today. First, FISA permits warrantless
surveillance of a foreign power for one year."  However, the
definition of foreign power in this provision is extremely narrow and
would not encompass terrorist organizations.32  Additionally, in
emergencies, the government may conduct warrantless surveillance for
up to seventy-two hours without a court order.
33
B. CRITIQUES OF THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
Despite the dearth of information regarding the TSP,
commentators have frequently condemned the program as a violation
of FISA.34 These critics assert that the procedures codified in FISA
represent the sole method through which the executive branch can
conduct electronic surveillance, a relationship unchanged by
subsequent legislation.
35
28 id.
29 See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, In
re Appeal from July 19, 2002 Opinion of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
(No. 02-001), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/091902FISCRbrief.pdf.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Belfield,
692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Va. 1997).
3' 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (2000).
32 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A) (2000).
3' 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2000).
34 See, e.g., SwinE, supra note 12, at 6-7; Sims, supra note 9, at 140; Decker, supra note 16, at
315-20.
35 See SwIPE, supra note 12, at 6-12; see also Decker, supra note 16, at 315-20.
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It is generally accepted that the president has the power to conduct
electronic surveillance.36 However, this power is not unlimited: the
Constitution serves as a fundamental check on the executive's power
to conduct electronic surveillance. 37 Furthermore, Congress enacted
FISA to regulate the executive branch's use of electronic surveillance
when gathering foreign intelligence information.
3 8
The real debate centers on the degree to which FISA regulates or
limits the executive's power to conduct electronic surveillance. The
U.S. Code explicitly states that FISA is "the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted. ' 39 In light of this
language, critics argue that FISA regulations governed the activities
conducted through the TSP.
40
However, FISA contains a provision that permits Congress to
amend the Act through subsequent legislation.4' The Bush
administration believes that, since Congress empowered the president
to conduct the war in Afghanistan through the AUMF, it amended
42FISA by implication to allow the TSP. However, critics deny the
contention that the AUMF, or any other statute, has repealed the
procedural constraints on electronic surveillance contained in FISA. 3
In countering the president's claims, critics frequently employ a
variety of interpretive tactics. Critics are quick to point out that the
law disapproves of repeals by implication." Commentators assert that
Congress would not silently amend FISA through a statute that never
once refers to the NSA, electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens, or
36 Sims, supra note 9, at 133-40.
37 See infra Section III, for discussion of the constitutional limitations on the president's power
to conduct electronic surveillance.
38 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 15 (1978).
39 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2000).
40 See SWIRE, supra note 12, at 1-2; Decker, supra note 16, at 317.
4' 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000).
42 For more information, see infra Section II(c).
43 See, e.g., SwiRE, supra note 12, at 1-2; Decker, supra note 16, at 321-33; Sims, supra note
9, at 130-33.
44 See, e.g., SwIRE, supra note 12, at 11-12.
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FISA itself.45 In fact, Congress has amended FISA five times since the
September 1 lth attacks without any mention of the AUMF.46
Critics also reject the administration's assertion that the AUMF
impliedly repeals FISA based on a simple dissection of the plain
meaning of the AUMF.47 The AUMF authorizes the president "to use
all necessary and proper force" to defend the U.S. against terrorists.
48
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the administration convinced the Supreme
Court that the detention of enemy combatants was a "necessary and
appropriate force" to fighting a war.49  Here, the administration
arguably encounters more difficulty in characterizing electronic
surveillance as "force."
The administration's attempts to broadly interpret the language of
the AUMF appear to be inconsistent with Congress' intent. While the
Court is not likely to consider congressional reaction, Congress'
response to the TSP provides some evidence of congressional intent.
Senator Tom Daschle stated that the government considered granting
the president authorization to use "appropriate force in the United
States and against those nations [that support terrorists]. .. ," before
ultimately deciding to limit the authorization to "appropriate force
against those nations." 50  Senator Daschle explained that the Senate
rejected the former language because it "would have given the
president broad authority to exercise expansive powers not just
overseas-where we all understood he wanted authority to act-but
right here in the United States."
51
The Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision could provide useful insight in
grasping how the Supreme Court is likely to interpret the AUMF. In
Hamdi, the Supreme Court interpreted the clause in the AUMF that
authorizes the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force
45 See, e.g., Sims, supra note 9, at 132; Decker, supra note 16, at 323-24; SwIRE, supra note
12, at 6-7.
46 Sims, supra note 9, at 132.
47 SWIRE, supra note 12, at 7-12; Decker, supra note 16, at 321-22.
48 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
49 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
50 Tom Daschle, Op-Ed., Power We Didn't Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005, at A21,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/22/AR2005122201101.html (emphasis added).
51 id.
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against those nations . . . he determines planned . . . the terrorist
attacks. 52 The Court held that the clause "necessary and appropriate
force" provided the president with the authority to detain enemy
combatants because the detention of troops was a "fundamental
incident of waging war."
53
Some critics contend that the use of electronic surveillance is not a
fundamental incident to war. On its face, a more likely interpretation
is that the act of capturing a prisoner of war on the battlefield is far
easier to classify as a "fundamental incident of waging war" than
intercepting communication between U.S. citizens and suspected
terrorists abroad.5 4 Furthermore, wiretaps gather a broader range of
information without discerning whether the content has any relation to
national security.55  The existence of a congressionally approved
manner of using wiretaps necessitates the finding that this less
discerning method of gathering information is not a "fundamental
incident to war."
56
As previously noted, FISA contains two exceptions that provide
conditions where the government may conduct electronic surveillance
without first obtaining a warrant.5 7  Some critics believe that the
presence of the second exception reinforces the illegitimacy of the
TSP. Suzanne Spaulding, who served as the executive director of the
National Commission on Terrorism, noted:
FISA anticipates situations in which speed is essential. It
allows the government to start eavesdropping without a court
order and to keep it going for a maximum of three days. And
while the FISA application process is often burdensome in
routine cases, it can also move with remarkable speed when
52 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
S3Id. at 519.
54 Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REv.
1189, 1252 (2006).
55 Decker, supra note 16, at 325-28.
56 ld.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 19-33.
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necessary, with applications written and approved in just a
few hours.5"
Additionally, the special court overseeing FISA warrants has been
extremely accommodating over the years; through December 25, 2005,
only four of 5,645 applications for warrants were denied.59
Critics contend that the collective weight of these arguments
proves that Congress did not amend FISA through the AUMF. With
FISA surviving without amendment, the TSP was subject to the
procedural guidelines established in the Act. The TSP indisputably
operated outside the FISA regulations; therefore, critics conclude that
the program was a clear violation of federal law.
C. FISA PERMITS THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
In 2007, the Bush administration admitted that aspects of the TSP
did not correspond with the procedures established in FISA.60  The
administration maintains, however, that the program was legal because
FISA was amended to allow for the sort of surveillance that took
place61 or, alternatively, because FISA is unconstitutional.62 FISA
specifically provides for surveillance outside its established parameters
if the surveillance is "authorized by statute." 63  The Bush
administration asserts that the AUMF authorizes electronic
surveillance outside the scope of FISA.64  Alternatively, the
58 Suzanne Spaulding, Power Play: Did Bush Roll Past the Legal Stop Signs?, WASH. POST,
Dec. 25, 2005, at B 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/ 12/23/AR2005122302050_pf.html.
59 Id.
60 AG Letter, supra note 4.
61 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NSA PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS
MYTH V. REALITY (Jan. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/nsamythvreality.pdf [hereinafter Myth v. Reality];
Sims, supra note 9, at 133-34.
62 White Paper, supra note 17, at 3.
63 50 U.S.C § 1809 (2000).
64 White Paper, supra note 17, at 2.
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administration reasons that FISA unconstitutionally restricts the
president's power if it precludes the TSP.65
On January 27, 2006, the Department of Justice released a
memorandum stating that "[t]he President's authority to authorize the
terrorist surveillance program is firmly based . . . in [the AUMF]
passed by Congress after the September 11 attacks." 66 The AUMF
grants the president the power to use "all necessary and appropriate
military force" against those responsible for the attacks. 67  The
Department of Justice claims that the expansive language employed by
Congress carries significant meaning: "In the field of foreign affairs,
and particularly that of war powers and national security,
congressional enactments are to be broadly construed where they
indicate support for authority long asserted and exercised by the
executive branch., 68 Intelligence activities, in general, and wartime
surveillance, in particular, are powers long asserted by the president
and recognized by U.S. courts.
In response to the argument disfavoring an implied amendment to
FISA, the Department of Justice contends that the drafting of FISA
evidences Congress's express allowance for implied repeals of FISA.7°
Congress broadly exempts electronic surveillance from FISA
regulations when the surveillance is authorized by another statute.71 In
contrast, other FISA provisions strictly require an amendment to• 72
circumvent the regulations stipulated in the Act. The Department of
Justice reasons that Congress could not have intended the provision to
encompass a narrow exception because they wrote 50 U.S.C.
§ 1809(a)(1) with expansive language; Congress surely knew how to
draft a narrow provision and expressly chose not to do so. 7 3
651Id. at29.
66 Myth v. Reality, supra note 61.
67 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
68 White Paper, supra note 17, at 11.
61Id. at 14-15.
7oId. at 20-21.
71 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000).
72 White Paper, supra note 17, at 21-24.
731d. at20.
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The Department of Justice maintains that the AUMF impliedly
grants the president the power to conduct electronic surveillance
outside FISA's procedural constraints. 74 To reach this conclusion, the
Department of Justice points to the AUMF's authorization for the
president to use "all necessary and appropriate force." 75 In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld7 the Supreme Court interpreted the breadth of this
language. 6 The issue before the Court was whether the clause
"necessary and appropriate force" provided the president with the
authority to detain enemy combatants.77 The Court held that detention
of enemy troops is "an incident to war" and thus it classifies as
"appropriate force" that the president is entitled to use.78  The
Department of Justice claims warrantless electronic surveillance is also
"an incident to war" just like detention of enemy combatants. 79
In short, the Department of Justice argues that Congress drafted
FISA in a manner that permits implied amendments to the regulations
established through the Act. The administration reads the Supreme
Court's Hamdi opinion to authorize the president to conduct
warrantless wiretaps. Therefore, the administration uses a liberal
definition of "force" to conclude that Congress impliedly amended
FISA through the AUMF.
III. IS THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM CONSTITUTIONAL?
The Bush administration and critics of the TSP predictably differ
as to the program's constitutionality. The Department of Justice warns
that congressional intrusion into the President's implied power to
gather intelligence could be unconstitutional.8 0 Alternatively, critics
assert that Congress operated within its constitutional power in
74 1d. at 26.
75Id. at 27.
76 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507.
77
1d. at 516-17.
781d. at 518.
79 White Paper, supra note 17, at 14-17 (The Department of Justice traces the historical use of
spies and other forms of covert intelligence gathering to establish their finding that wiretaps
are a "fundamental incident to war.").
'old. at 28-36.
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enacting FISA81 and that the TSP raises First and Fourth Amendment
issues.g
A. THE PRESIDENT'S ARTICLE II POWERS
The president's powers are established in Article II of the U.S.
Constitution.83 Among those powers granted to the president are the
powers to act as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and to
tend to the United States' foreign affairs. 84 The Justice Department
proposes that the duty to protect the U.S. from foreigrn enemies is
entwined within these constitutionally-guaranteed powers.
85
The right to collect intelligence follows the duty to protect the U.S.
from its enemies: the president needs information to make informed
decisions regarding matters of national security. The Supreme Court
has frequently determined that the president has authority to employ
espionage to gather information necessary to protect the country.n
Consequently, the Bush administration has warned that any attempt to
limit the president's power to obtain foreign intelligence could be an
unconstitutional infringement on the executive's Article II power.
87
Many critics maintain the TSP is unconstitutional despite the
presidential power to guard the U.S. from foreign enemies.8 Some
dissenters doubt the administration's assertion that the Constitution
grants the president the power to gather foreign intelligence;
89
however, even assuming that the administration does have this power,
some critics argue that congressional authority to legislate in the field
of foreign intelligence is well established.9°" Therefore, they insist
81 Sims, supra note 9, at 133-35; Decker, supra note 16, at 342.
82 Decker, supra note 16, at 345.
83 U.S. CONST. art. II.
84 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
85 White Paper, supra note 17, at 6-7.
86 1d. at7.
87 d. at 28-36.
88 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 12; Sims, supra note 9.
89 See, e.g., SwINE, supra note 12, at 14-15.
90 Decker, supra note 16, at 342.
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FISA is the product of constitutionally permissible congressional
action.
91
The seminal case articulating the Supreme Court doctrine
governing the collision of presidential powers and congressional
legislation is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer ("Steel Seizure
Case ").92 In the Steel Seizure Case, a potential strike at the nation's
steel mills threatened to hamper steel production during the Korean
War. 9 3  President Truman intervened and attempted to allow the
Secretary of Commerce to run the mills for the United States.94 The
Court held that President Truman did not have authority to operate the
mills on the nation's behalf. 95 Although Justice Black delivered the
Court's plurality opinion, Justice Jackson's concurring opinion has
provided the substantial precedent.96  Justice Jackson created a
trichotomy explaining the scope of presidential powers when Congress
has authorized, failed to act in light of, or passed legislation
incompatible with executive actions. Commentators argue that the
Bush administration's actions are a clear case of category-three
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., SWIRE, supra note 12, at 13.
93 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952).
94 Id. at 583.
95Id. at 588-89.
96 SwiRE, supra note 12, at 13.
97 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 631-38.
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate."
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
... Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system. Id. at 636-38.
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analysis as set forth in the Steel Seizure Case-where the president's
actions are incompatible with congressional will.98 Congress has the
authority to legislate in the area of foreign intelligence;99 Congress
enacted FISA in 1978 and has kept this aspect of FISA intact for the
duration of the Act;100 the President's employment of the TSP is
admittedly at odds with FISA's mandates.
01
Justice Jackson's three category approach explains the Bush
administration's desire to find authorization for electronic surveillance
of U.S. citizens in the AUMF. If the courts determine that the
AUMF's authorization to engage in the "incidents of waging war"
includes electronic surveillance, the president's surveillance program
will be subject to category-one analysis. However, the majority of
commentators, 10 2 and at least one federal judge, 10 3 agree that the issue
warrants category-three analysis.
B. THE FouRTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment ensures that Americans have the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 104 This amendment
was intended to ensure that unlike the "tyrannical invasions . . .
endured by the colonists, ' 1° Americans would be free from such
"[e]xecutive abuses of the power to search."' 0 6 The practice of
requiring probable cause to obtain warrants ensures that Americans are
not subject to unreasonable search and seizure. 10 7
98 SwiRE, supra note 12, at 14.
9' H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at 24 (1978).
'
00 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
101 White Paper, supra note 17, at 28.
102 See, e.g., Sims, supra note 9; Bradley, supra note 12.
'
03ACLUI, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
104 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"' Keith, 407 U.S. at 328-29 (Douglas, J., concurring).
.
06 ACLUI 438 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
107 Id.
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Justice Powell's opinion in Keith emphasizes the importance of the
Fourth Amendment, especially in cases of "national security.
1°8
Justice Powell noted that "[h]istory abundantly documents the
tendency of Government-however benevolent and benign its
motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its
policies. Fourth Amendment protections become more necessary when
the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. ' 1°9" Again, it was this very
tendency in the British monarchy that spawned the Fourth
Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment's requirement of judicially issued
warrants protects Americans from baseless searches through review by
an independent judiciary. Justice Powell's opinion in Keith
persuasively explains the need for judicially ordered warrants,
The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive
officers of Government as neutral and disinterested
magistrates. Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the
laws, to investigate, and to prosecute. But those charged
with this investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be
the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to
obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential
invasions of privacy and protected speech.11 0
Thus, the neutral disposition of the judiciary provides a safeguard
against unreasonable searches.
The TSP operates without this fundamental safeguard. However,
that is not the only requirement the TSP circumvents. Commentators
note that the Supreme Court permits searches only where there is both
individualized suspicion and judicial oversight."11 The Supreme Court
has consistently held that open-ended warrants are constitutionally
108 Keith, 407 U.S. at 313.
'
09 1d. at 313-14.
Id. at 317 (citation omitted).
"' Curtis Bradley et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Feb. 9,
2006, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650.
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prohibited. 112 In Ybarra v. Illinois, the Court held that a warrant for a
tavern did not provide law enforcement with the authority to search
each individual who happened to be present at the bar during a raid.
1 3
This is effectively how the TSP works: the NSA is given carte
blanche to investigate individuals who allegedly communicate with a
person or organization associated with al Qaeda. As a result, the
program ignores the Fourth Amendment safeguards established
through centuries of legislation and legal precedent.
The current administration asserts that the TSP is consistent with
the Fourth Amendment.114  In New Jersey v. T.L.O., Justice
Blackmun's concurrence implied that there may be times where
warrants are impractical1 1 5  The Department of Justice claims that
"[f]oreign intelligence collection, especially in a time of war when
catastrophic attacks have already been launched inside the United
States, falls within the special needs context.""'
16
Critics counter that the TSP is not excusable under the narrow
"special needs" exception. 117 The "special needs" exception excuses
only a narrow class of searches."18  The searches generally occur in
situations where the subject of the search has a limited riht of
privacy, and where obtaining a warrant may be impractical." The
TSP does not fit within these parameters. Presumably, some targets of
these federal wiretaps are individuals in their homes and the special
procedures established through FISA enable the NSA to quickly gain
warrants. Moreover, special provisions in FISA enable the
government to obtain post facto warrants. 1 2 0 Warrantless wiretapping
112 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 (1979).
113 id
114 Myth v. Reality, supra note 61.
115 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
116 Myth v. Reality, supra note 61.
117 Bradley, supra note 111.
11 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
120 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2000).
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has never been exempt under the special needs exception and it does
not appear to fit within the courts' interpretation of the term.
121
C. STATE SECRETS, STANDING, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
While some aspects of the TSP are known, the details regarding its
operations remain undisclosed. The Bush administration has kept the
program's inner-workings secret by employing the state secrets
privilege. By guarding the information, the government has hampered
plaintiffs' ability to meet U.S. standing requirements. In an attempt to
overcome this burden, plaintiffs have invoked the "chilling effect"
doctrine to raise First Amendment claims. 122
1. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
The state secrets privilege permits the government to refrain from
disclosing information that may be detrimental to national security.
The U.S. government may invoke the state secrets privilege if
disclosure would compromise military secrets. 123 While "the claim of
privilege should not be lightly accepted, . . . the most compelling
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is
ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake." 124 In the context
of espionage, military secrets consist of "NSA capabilities and other
valuable intelligence information to a sophisticated intelligence
analyst.'' 1
25
In ACLU v. National Security Agency, the district court held that
the executive branch properly exercised the state secrets privilege.
126
The district court reviewed materials submitted by the government ex
parte and in camera.127  After reviewing these materials, the court
conceded that disclosure of the materials the Plaintiff sought would
121 Bradley, supra note 111.
122 See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 657 (6th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter ACLU 1].
123 U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
1241id.
125 Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
126 ACLUI, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 764.
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have national security implications. 128 The Sixth Circuit subsequently
affirmed the district court's decision to recognize the government's
state secrets privilege. 1
29
2. STANDING
Article III of the U.S. Constitution establishes the "case-or-
controversy requirement" for the federal courts. 130 The requirement-
known as "standing"--ensures that the federal courts will only hear
cases that involve a genuine case or controversy.131
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court established a
three prong test to determine whether a plaintiff has standing: (1) "The
plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact"; (2) "There must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of';
and (3) "It must be likely ... that the injury will be 'redressed by a
favorable decision."",132 A plaintiffs case must pass the Lujan test in
order for the plaintiff to have standing to appear in federal court.
In ACLU v. National Security Agency, the district court determined
that a group of individuals who were likely targets of the TSP had
standing to sue the NSA. 133 The Plaintiffs established "injury in fact"
through a First Amendment doctrine known as the "chilling effect."'
134
Essential to the Plaintiffs' claim was the assertion that their First
Amendment right to communicate with "sources, clients, and potential
witnesses" has been chilled as a direct result of the TSP.
135
Consequently, the harm done to the Plaintiffs "[was] a concrete, actual
inability to communicate" with these sources and the increased costs
that the Plaintiffs incurred to perform their professional duties in this
128 Id.
'
29ACLUII, 493 F.3d at 650-51.
130 Id. at 659.
131 id
132 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).
133 ACLUI, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 765-67.
134 Id. at 768-69.
' Id. at 769.
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chilled environment (e.g., travelin to the Middle East in order to
securely communicate with clients).
After determining that Plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact, the
district court found that the Plaintiffs' case easily passed the second
and third prongs of the Lujan test. 137 The court noted that the TSP
targeted electronic communications between alleged agents of al
Qaeda and parties in the United States, and that knowledge of this fact
is the basis for the "chilled" communication alleged by the
Plaintiffs.'38 Therefore, there was a direct causal connection between
the injury and the offending conduct. 139 Finally, the court noted that a
favorable decision for the Plaintiffs would remove this impediment to
the exchange of communication between the Plaintiffs and their
sources. '
4 0
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order and
remanded the case for dismissal on the grounds that the Plaintiffs' case
lacked standing. 14 1 The Sixth Circuit three-judge panel produced three
separate opinions, with Judge Batchelder penning the leadingopinion142 The three opinions expressed considerably different
understandings of the current judicial doctrine governing standing and
chilled speech. 1
43
While Judge Batchelder was thoroughly unconvinced by the
Plaintiffs' First Amendment injury-in-fact argument, she ultimately
decided the issue on the causation and redressability prongs of the
Lujan test.144 She determined that the Plaintiffs' attempt to raise aFirst Amendment issue was nothing more than a ploy to avail
themselves of the "First Amendment's relaxed rules on standing.'
145
136 id.
131 Id. at 770-71.
131 Id. at 770.
139ld.
'40 Id. at 770-71.
141 ACLUII, 493 F.3d at 648.
142 id.
143 Id.
'44 Id. at 666.
145 Id. at 657.
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Judge Batchelder employed simple and practical logic to dismantle the
Plaintiffs' causation and redressability elements. She noted that
wiretaps are secret; therefore, it was the act of secretly intercepting
communications, and not the warrantless nature of the wiretaps, that
caused the Plaintiffs' alleged injury.1 46 Furthermore, forcing the NSA
to abide by FISA procedures would not alleviate the threat to the
Plaintiff of having communications intercepted by the NSA.14 7 "The
only way to redress the injury would be to enjoin all wiretaps .... "148
The Sixth Circuit's majority opinion declaring that the Plaintiffs'
inability to establish that they were actually subjected to NSA wiretaps
proved fatal to both their Fourth Amendment and their Separation of
Powers claims. 149 To bring this particular Fourth Amendment claim, a
plaintiff must establish that he was personally subjected to an illegal
search or seizure. 1
50
The opinion addressed the unpalatable dilemma that inevitably
arises in this situation: with the government shielding its actions with
the state secrets privilege, no plaintiff can raise Fourth Amendment or
Separation of Powers claims. 151 The Sixth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court has addressed this predicament before and held, "the
assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would
have standing, is not a reason to find standing."' 152 Rather, the court
concluded that this is the very sort of political question that belongs in
a public forum.153 Additionally, the court wisely noted that it should
not exceed its constitutional power to condemn the executive branch
for exceeding its constitutional authority.
154
146 Id. at 666-70.
147 Id. at 670-73.
148 Id. at 672.
149 Id. at 673-75.
"0 Id. at 673.
151 See id. at 675-76.
152 ACLUII, 493 F.3d at 675 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 227 (1974)).
113 Id. at 676 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974)).
1 54 Id. at 676.
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To bring a FISA claim, a plaintiff must constitute an "aggrieved
person" under the meaning of the statute.15 5 The term "aggrieved
person" is commensurate to the Fourth Amendment concept of
standing. 156 Consequently, "for the same reason that [Plaintiffs] could
not maintain their Fourth Amendment claim-they cannot establish that
they are 'aggrieved persons' under FISA's statutory scheme.'
5 7
The concurring and dissenting opinions, written by Judges
Gibbons and Gilman, respectively, centered on whether the "fear of
harm" can constitute an injury-in-fact. 158 Judge Gibbons interpreted
Supreme Court doctrine to "require that [P]laintiffs demonstrate that
they (1) are in fact subject to the defendant's conduct, in the past or
future, and (2) have at least a reasonable fear of harm from that
conduct."'159 Judge Gilman, on the other hand, understood Supreme
Court doctrine to simply require that defendants engage in unlawful
conduct and Plaintiffs possess a reasonable fear of harm from this
conduct.'
60
IV. RESPONSE TO THE PROGRAM
The response to the revelation of the TSP in The New York Times
has been significant. 16 1 Several law schools across the nation have
held symposia on the topic.' 62  Members of Congress, from both
parties, introduced a number of bills on the topic in 2006. In January
"' Id. at 682-83.
156 id.
Ild. at 683.
158 See id. at 688-720.
159 Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
"0 Id. at 699.
161 As of February 2008, a Google search of "Terrorist Surveillance Program" produced over
100,000 hits.
162 See, e.g., War, Terrorism, and Torture: Limits on Presidential Power in the 21 st Century,
Indiana Law School, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.law.indiana.edu/front/special/
20051007_presidential.shtml; The Most Dangerous Branch?,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070120104135rn_1/www.yalelawjournal.org/symposium2005/.
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2007, The New York Times described the controversy as "13 months
of bruising national debate."
1 63
Perhaps the most relevant response to the TSP is the recent
litigation challenging the abandoned program's legality. In August
2006, the American Civil Liberties Union won a judgment against the
National Security Agency. 64  In the opinion, District Judge Taylor
found the TSP unconstitutional in that it violated the Fourth
Amendment and FISA. 165 The administration appealed the case, and
the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in July 2007. 6
6
The Circuit Court's decision turned on the Plaintiffs' standing, rather
than the constitutionality of the TSP.
167
Another case, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, has
made national headlines in 2007.168 Al-Haramain sued the Bush
administration for allegedly conducting warrantless surveillance on the
organization and its directors. 169  The district court denied the
government's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment, a decision from which the Defendants appealed. 170  The
case appeared before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit on August 15, 2007, for oral arguments, 17rand the Court held
that Plaintiffs could not establish standing because the state secrets
privilege presently empowered the government to withhold
163 Lichtblau & Johnson, supra note 12.
164ACLUI, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
165 id.
16 6ACLU II, 493 F.3d at 648.
167 Id.
16' Adam Liptak, US. Defends Surveillance to 3 Skeptical Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/washington/16nsa.html; Jennifer Granick, Commentary,
Nation's Soul is at Stake in NSA Surveillance Case, WIRED, Aug. 15, 2007,
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/commentary/circuitcourt/2007/08/circuitcourt-0815.
169 A-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218.
"Old. at 1233.
71 Liptak, supra note 168. The court's docket, available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/calendar.nsf/FB7FDOC2F524ABAC88257336007DDEOA/$f
ile/sf08_07.pdfqopenelement, reports that 06-36083 was heard following Hepting v. AT&T
Corp. Presumably, this is Al-Haramain Islamic Found, Inc. v. Bush, but it is not evident from
the docket.
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evidence. 172 However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for a determination on the issue of whether FISA could
preempt the state secrets privilege.' 
73
V. CONCLUSION
The president's revocation of the TSP has ended a brief but
extremely controversial trip through constitutionally muddy waters.
The Department of Justice's defense of the program failed to persuade
a federal district court of the program's legality and constitutionality.
A Republican Congress failed to pass legislation that would have
excused the president's actions. The majority of legal scholars
commenting on the program found it either illegal, unconstitutional, or
both. Despite all these hurdles, the federal courts and Congress never
halted the program's operation. The TSP may no longer operate, but
the principal questions it provoked remain.
173 Id. at 1206.
172 AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007).
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